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Discrimination
Pakistan: the right to marry
by Mr Justice Tassaduq Hussain Jilani
The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979, was the culmination of the age-old odyssey to 
establish equality between men and women. Its proponents 
were conscious of the toll, the sufferings and wages of the 
gender bias. They therefore made a global call for a collective 
struggle to carve out a just social order and to evolve a 'newer' 
world. The spirit of the convention, in the words of Tennyson, 
was:
'TTie /on^ Jay wanes; (Ac s/ow moon c/im6s; fne jeep 
/Woans round" wifn man)' voices. Come, my^riena's; 
' 7is not too /afe fo seeA a newer wor/j. '
(Alfred, Lord Tennyson, Mysses)
The moans were replaced by a new resolve and determination 
to pursue the goals set out in the 'Magna Carta' of women's 
rights in various spheres of life. On the issue of the right to 
marry, art. 16 of the CEDAW mandated inter alia. as follows:
' / . States parties sna/7 faAe a/7 appropriate measure; fo eliminate 
discrimination against women in a/7 matters re/afin^ fo marriage ana* 
re/ations an J in parficu/ar sna/7 ensure, on a 6asis o^ eauaJify o^ 
nJ women.
fne same ri^/nf fo enter info marriage;
tne same ri^nf ^ ree/^' to cnoose a jpou.se ana* to enter info 
marriage on/y wifn tAeir^ree anJ^uJ/ consent;
fne same rianf/s/ anJ responsifSjVifies Jurin^ marriaae ana" at its 
jisso/ufion. '
EAST v WEST
The right of an adult woman to marry a person of her choice 
is well recognised in the civilised world today In the West a 
father reacting to his adult daughter's decision to marry a 
person against his wishes would only be found in some 
Victorian drama or a Shakespearian tragedy In the East, 
however, instances are not lacking where the objections of 
parents and elders lead to violence and killing in the name of 
'honour'.
The right of an adult woman to marry a person of her choice 
is well recognised in the civilised world today. In the West a 
father reacting to his adult daughter's decision to marry a 
person against his wishes would only be found in some Victorian 
drama or a Shakespearian tragedy. In the East, however, 
instances are not lacking where the objections of parents and 
elders lead to violence and killing in the name of 'honour'. The 
denial of the right to marry a person of choice is one of the 
major reasons for violence against young women in some third- 
world countries. I would like to share our experience in 
Pakistan. The issues that I propose to highlight are the following:I * O o o
(1) the right to marry: sociological and historical perspective;
(2) the right of marriage in Islam; and
(3) the constitutional provisions and role of the courts in 
Pakistan.
SOCIO-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The institution of marriage and the right to marry as we 
understand them today are the result of a long process of 
evolution. As far back as the memory of history can perceive the 
freedom of the individual in choosing a mate was strictly limited 
by social need and a wTitten or an unwritten code. Societies 
regulated this domain and laid down parameters within which it 
was permissible to marry. The first sexual taboos seem to have 
aimed at preventing the mating of parents and children, then the 
brothers and sisters and gradually the prohibitions spread to 
exogamy (prohibition to marry within the tribe) and endogamy 
(marrying someone from within one's own tribe or group).
Wealth and property have played an important role in 
marriage. Be it the Occident or the Orient, the girl was mated 
by her parents, who mostly kept a proprietary interest in view 
while taking such a decision. However, with the spread of 
education and the economic independence of men and women, 
the 'romantic love and choice marriage' brought about a social 
sea change in the institution of marriage. In the West this has led 
to a complete metamorphosis, and the right of an adult girl to 
marry a person of her own choice stands recognized both 
socially and legally. In the East, however, the subjective 
perception of religion, social, feudal and tribal taboos regulate 
the exercise of this right in varying degrees.
Marriages in our part of the world, in the great majority of 
cases, are arranged by parents. The prospective bride and 
bridegroom do not meet, there is no courtship, and in some 
cases they see each other for the first time on the wedding night. 
This may appear shocking to an observer from the West but this 
culture is the logical consequence of our socio-economic 
conditions. The family is still the dominating institution. Crucial 
decisions regarding the marriage of girls are made mostly by the 
head of the family and the girl is persuaded to accept the 
proposal. Notwithstanding some grey areas, these arranged 
marriages have several advantages: in a segregated society where 
boys and girls normally cannot meet, the practice of arranged 
marriages ensures that the interests of both the parties are 
pursued more meaningfully and with mature advice. Seventy per 
cent of the girls here do not even go to primary school and 
therefore are neither socially nor economically independent. 
The family's role in these circumstances and in most of the cases 
is a welcome relief However, in certain parts of Pakistan and in 
some families the social taboos or tribal prejudices overwhelm 
the parental authority to such an extent that it operates to the 
detriment of the women. This dilemma has been acknowledged 
in the rb^istan Nationa/ Report submitted to the Fourth World 
Conference on Women in September 199S in Beijing, in which 
it was stated that: 25
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'The persistence of tribal and feudal structures has perpetuated the 
culture of stereotyped roles for girls and women. The socialization 
process creates gender differences from childhood, and together with the 
early age of marriage, early and frequent pregnancies, large family size, 
and the perception of the limited reproductive and domestic roles of 
women places restrictions on their mobility and participation in the 
productive process and decision-making.'
Given the socio-economic milieu that women have to live in, 
it is no wonder that girls are given in marriage without their 
consent and in a few cases even sold in marriage. The sporadic 
incidents of violence that we witness are symptomatic of a girl 
rebelling against these taboos to establish her right to marry a 
person of her choice.
THE RIGHT OF MARRIAGE IN ISLAM
Although there are clear commands of the Holy Prophet 
Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) regarding the requirement 
for a girl's consent to marriage, this issue has been the subject 
of controversy among the Muslim jurists. There are broadly 
speaking five schools of jurists in Islam. These are:
  Maliki
  Hambali
  Hanafi
  Sha'afi, and
  Jafri.
There is a broad consensus among Muslim jurists that a 
Muslim woman needs a wali (guardian), usually a father, to 
contract marriage. However, there are conflicting views on the 
extent of the wali's authority in matters of marriage. Some 
jurists are of the view that a marriage without a wali's consent is 
void while others regard the wali's role as that of a guide and 
hold that the marriage of an adult woman can be performed 
even without the consent of her wali. The concept of Tjtihad' is 
a recognized mode of reasoning whereby, in the event of lack of 
any specific command over an issue, the matter is resolved in the 
light of the Quranic injunctions. The Superior Courts in 
Pakistan have played a pivotal role in interpreting various 
concepts of Islamic law.
Today the case law on this issue is mostly in favour of the view 
that a young adult woman can enter into marriage without the 
consent of her wali. Three judgments of the Federal Shariat 
Court of Pakistan, i.e. Muhammad Imtiaz St^Anor v The State PLD 
1981 FSC 308, ArifHussain S^Azra Perveen v The State PLD 1982 
FSC 42, Muhammad Ramzan v The State PLD 1984 FSC 93 and 
two judgments of the Lahore High Court, i.e. Hafiz Abdul Waheed 
v Miss Asma Jahangir &^Anor PLD 1997 Lahore 301 and Mst. 
Humana Mehmood v SHO North Cantt. Lahore St^Ors PLJ 1999 
Lahore 1474 and 1999 Pakistan Current Criminal Rulings 542O
Lahore, would be relevant in this context.
Conscious of the social taboos, and with a view to highlighting' o o o
the importance of consent in Islam, some of the Muslim 
countries have codified the requirement of a girl's consent to 
marriage. In Tunisia the law mandates that consent of both the 
spouses is essential in marriage. Yemeni law declares that a 
marriage where consent is obtained through coercion would be 
void. In Syria, which is a predominantly Hanafi State, the Syrian 
Personal Status Code limits a wali's ability unfairly to block, 
delay or cause the avoidance of marriage of a girl who has
reached the age of majority. In Morocco the Personal Status 
Code prohibits a wali from forcing a female into marriage, 
whether she is a virgin or otherwise, provided she has attained 
the age of majority (Aziza Y Al-Hibra, Marriage S^Divorce, Legal 
Foundations).
IJTIHAD
The concept of 'Ijtihad' is a recognized mode of reasoning 
whereby, in the event of lack of any specific command over an 
issue, the matter is resolved in the light of the Quranic
' O ^-
injunctions. The Superior Courts in Pakistan have played a 
pivotal role in interpreting various concepts of Islamic law.
The demand to grant equal rights to women in matters of 
marriage is enshrined in the Cairo Declaration on Human 
Rights in Islam, agreed at a conference attended byo o J
representatives of all the Muslim countries on 5 August, 1990 
(Edward Lawson, Encyclopedia of Human Rights, 2nd edn, at 
p. 176). Article 5 of this declaration mandates as follows:
'(a) The family is the foundation of society, and marriage is the basis 
of its formation. Men and women have the right to marriage, and no 
restrictions stemming from race, colour or nationality shall prevent them 
from enjoying this right.
(b) Society and the State shall remove all obstacles to marriage and 
shall facilitate marital procedure. They shall ensure family protection 
and welfare.'
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
guarantees equal rights to women. It would be pertinent to refer 
to some of the important provisions highlighting the equality of 
men and women. Article 25(2) provides that 'there shall be no 
discrimination on the basis of sex alone'. Article 25(3) reiterates 
that 'nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making 
any special provision for the protection of women and children'. 
Article 35 provides that 'the State shall protect the marriage, the 
family, the mother and the child'.
These provisions would indicate that the Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan envisages complete equality 
between men and women and mandates that the State shall 
provide protection to marriage. However, a lot was left to the 
Legislature. Unlike the legislation made in some other Muslim 
countries, the right of an adult woman to marry a person of her 
choice has not been specifically provided for in any law in 
Pakistan. Perhaps it was taken for granted, or it may be on 
account of the social and tribal taboos or a myopic perception 
of religion that this was never a priority issue with the law 
makers. The void has, however, been filled by the courts.
The right of an adult woman to marry a person of her choice 
has now been well recognized in judicial pronouncements in 
Pakistan. Barring one or two judgments given by the High 
Court, the preponderance of case law is in favour of the view 
that in Islam the permission of a guardian is not required if an 
adult woman wants to marry a person of her own choice. The 
permission of a guardian, or guidance, may be socially desirable 
but it has been held that it is not mandatory in Islam. The courts
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have maintained a progressive and liberal profile and thereby 
have also curbed the misuse of the Hudood Laws. In Muhammad 
Imtiaz's case, a young woman aged 18 married of her own choice, 
a criminal case was registered against the girl and her husband,o o o
on the statement of her father, alleging abduction, theft and 
adultery and the learned trial court convicted both of them, 
notwithstanding the defence plea taken by the girl that the case 
was false and that the father had had the case registered as he 
was not happy about the marriage. The matter went up in appeal 
before the Federal Shariat Court, and after a detailed discussion 
on the concept of the right to marry in Islam the court set aside 
the conviction and held that a girl who had reached the age ofo o
majority had a right to marry and that the consent of the 
guardian was not essential.
In Arif Hussain's case, again a father had a criminal case
J O
registered against his daughter on the allegation that she had 
been abducted by 'A' one and a half years previously, that they 
were leading a life of adultery and that out of the alleged illicit 
liaison they had given birth to a baby girl. The case was tried and 
valid marriage was taken as a plea in defence. The court, 
however, convicted both of them and sentenced them to ten 
years RI and a fine by holding that they had no written proof of 
marriage to support their plea. This judgment was set aside by 
the Federal Shariat Court on appeal and it reiterated a very 
important principle of Islamic jurisprudence on validity of 
marriage, i.e. it held that acknowledgement by a man and a 
woman that they are husband and wife raises a presumption of 
truth regarding the validity of the marriage and no written proof 
or registration is required.
The ratio reiterated in these two judgments was affirmed in 
yet another judgment, Muhammad Ramzan's case.
In a recent case in the Lahore High Court (Humaira's case), 
which I was called upon to decide, the dilemma of a girl 
marrying against the wishes of her parents came up in a rather 
poignant manner. It is a painful study and illustrates how far a 
father can go to assert his authority over the question of a young 
adult daughter's marriage. The facts of this case are that a youngo o J o
woman aged 28, the only daughter of a sitting member of theo J o o
Punjab Provincial Assembly, having a rural background but 
urbanized on account of having studied in a liberal institution, 
fell in love with a boy and wanted to marry him. This marriage 
was resisted by the parents, particularly the father, as he wanted
to give her hand in marriage to his nephew. This was to be ano or
exchange marriage. The girl 'H' secretly married the person of 
her choice 'M', but did not join him and made efforts to 
persuade her parents to accept the marriage. The parents 
rejected it and staged a forced marriage with her cousin (whose 
sister was already in their house as a daughter-in-law). She left 
the house and wanted to flee abroad with her husband, but on 
account of her father's influence as an MPA a criminal case was 
registered, she was arrested at the airport, openly dragged and 
beaten. She was granted bail by the High Court, but the bail 
order was not honoured and the police attempted to hand over 
her custody to her brother and father, whereupon a petition was 
filed on her behalf by women activists alleging that she would be 
killed on account of so-called 'family honour'. Following a 
direction to the Inspector General of Punjab Police the girl was 
produced before the court and her statement was recorded. The 
father controverted her claim that she was already married to 
'M' and produced a video cassette of the arranged marriage with
his nephew. The issues mooted before the court in this case 
were:
(1) can a girl who has reached the age of majority can marry a 
man of her own choice and against the wishes of hero
guardian/father?
(2) what is the legal effect of the second marriage, which 
according to the girl was forced upon her by the father 
although, admittedly, she had not joined her second 
husband?
(3) could the court sitting in the constitutional jurisdiction 
enter into the factual inquiry qua the conflicting claims of 
marriages or should this be left to the civil court of plenary 
jurisdiction?
In a detailed judgment the right of a girl of adult age to marry 
a person of her choice was upheld. With reference to Islamic- 
law, the second marriage was held to be void ab initio; it was 
observed that in the video the girl was sobbing and theo o
bridegroom wore a gloomy expression that reflected her lack of 
consent. The court observed that, in a situation where the 
criminal case was false, the official record indicated that the 
second marriage was arranged by the father without her consento o J
at a later date, and that she was facing a death threat, the court 
could enter into a factual inquiry and give a tentative finding of 
fact on conflicting claims of marriage. Sending that matter to the 
civil court would have prolonged the agony of the young girl.I o o J J o o
This case acquired public importance both nationally and 
internationally and the positive sign is that, notwithstanding the 
social perception qua the role of the guardian and the father in 
matters relating to the marriage of young daughters, the 
judgment had wide acceptance and all the national dailies 
highlighted in their editorials the need for a change in attitudes 
and social mores with regard to the rights of young women in 
Pakistan. In its editorial of 20 February 1999, the English 
newspaper Dawn commented:
CAIRO DECLARATION
The demand to grant equal rights to women in matters of 
marriage is enshrined . in the Cairo Declaration on Human 
Rights in Islam, agreed at a conference attended by 
representatives of all the Muslim countries on 5 August, 1990
'Women activists, human rights lawyers and all enlightened people will 
welcome the judgment of the Lahore High Court in the 
Humaira/Mahmood Butt case. Although in legal terms this was a case of 
establishing the validity of a nikahnama and its implications jbr the couple 
under the Hudood laws, fundamental principles were at stake. One was the 
importance of consent of the two parties entering into a marriage contract. 
(Humaira had married Mahmood against the wishes of her father who 
forced her to enter into false matrimonial arrangement with a cousin). 
Another was the need to recognize the right of an adult woman as an 
independent entity and not a chattel of a male member of her.family. 
There was also the principle of the police protection to which citizens are 
entitled under the law and their right not to have mala fide criminal cases 
registered against them. Mercifully, the LHC has upheld all of these.
There are two vital social/political issues which have been thrown into 
focus by this case. One is that of safeguarding the institution of the 
family in a patriarchal society like ours. There is no right-minded 27
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person who would not uphold the sanctity of the family. But the need is 
to introduce the concept of human rights and women's rights in infra- 
family relationships. Those who try to subjugate women on the plea of 
observing Islamic laws need to be educated in the rights which have 
been granted to women by the sharia. Marriage in Islam is a contract 
whose validity depends on the freely given consent of the parties 
concerned. Quite often the woman's consent is taken far granted as the 
freedom of contract is violated through coercion or fraud, with her father 
or brother giving her away in marriage against her will.'
Similarly, the daily paper The News titled its editorial as 
'Changing Norms' and said:
'The Lahore High Court Thursday dismissed a Lludood case against 
the daughter of a Punjabi MTA, Humaira Butt, and her husband, 
Alahmood Butt, by validating the couple's marriage of their own free 
will, ending another of our modern day folk-lores, which could now be 
part of a bigger social change ...
... Of course, the role of human rights groups and some individuals 
dedicated to the cause offemale emancipation in advocating such cases 
is admirable. The media too, by and large, refuse to sit on the fence 
and, as happened in the Humaira Mahmood episode, coverage of police 
actions brought a number of facts to public knowledge. It has been seen 
that fables of threatened couples on the run always evoke a wave of 
general sympathy in what is believed to be a highly repressive, gender- 
biased society. The LHC verdict reinforces this propitious trend by 
granting legal and religious cover to changing norms replacing an 
untenable medieval ethos.'
CASE LAW
The right of an adult woman to marry a person of her choice 
has now been well recognized in judicial pronouncements in 
Pakistan. Barring one or two judgments given by the High 
Court, the preponderance of case law is in favour of the view 
that in Islam the permission of a guardian is not required if an 
adult woman wants to marry a person of her own choice. The 
permission of a guardian, or guidance, may be socially 
desirable but it has been held that it is not mandatory in 
Islam.
The Nation, in its editorial dated 22 February 1999, observed:
'The decision of the Lahore High Court to hold prima facie valid the 
love marriage of Humaira to Alahmood Butt brings to an end at least 
for the time being the painful uncertainty and suffering of the couple. 
While an Intra Court Appeal by the parents may lie ahead as of now it 
is a well deserved and an encouraging victory for the advocates of 
women's rights and indeed women themselves who notwithstanding the 
progress achieved towards their freedom as a result oj socio-economic 
compulsions of today, the introduction of modern trends in the country 
and the endeavours of enlightened groups remain in bondage of their 
parents especially when faced with the choice oj their spouses ...
... While Islam grants full freedom of choice to adult men and 
women to choose their future spouses the feudal customs which hold 
swav in our society virtually leave women with no other option than to 
accept the husbands chosen by their parents. The court's judgment it is 
hoped will go a long way in convincing the parents who are slave to this 
un-Islamic custom to take into account the wishes of their daughters 
about choosing their future's husbands. It defies all logic to believe that 
a man or a woman who has to spend a lifetime with his or her spouse
should have no say in the matter. Those who are struggling to ensure 
the grant of due rights and freedom to our unfortunate women deserve 
our full support. The court has rightly observed that "let there be no 
contradiction in our thoughts and actions. Male chauvinism, feudal 
bias and compulsion of a conceited ego should not be confused with 
Islamic values". It warned that "an enlightened approach is called for 
otherwise an obscurantism in this field may break the social fabric".'
An appeal was filed against this judgment but has been 
dismissed as withdrawn and the judgment has attained finality.
Humaira's case is one of the thousands of cases where women 
have raised their voice of dissent against exchange marriage or 
against an incompatible proposition and have made their own 
choice.
While upholding the girl's right to marry a person of her 
choice, the courts in Pakistan have never minimised the 
importance of the family; it is believed that it is a natural and 
divine institution which delineates the respective spheres of the 
father and mother, the husband and wife, and the brother and 
sister. We would like to protect this institution. But at the same 
time male chauvinism, conceited egos and the feudal/tribal bias 
should not be allowed to hold sway at the cost of a woman's 
right to have a life partner of her choice. The judiciary, through 
its pronouncements, endeavours on the one hand to instil the 
serenity to comprehend the winds of change in those who are 
jealous of their right as guardians to decide about their ward's 
marriage and, on the other, to give consideration to the maturity 
of voung women to make an informed choice.
J O
Social mores and practices change with the dynamics of time. 
Today in Pakistan we are witnessing a change which is 
concomitant with industrial revolution, the spread of education 
and the dawn of the age of reason. In a society steeped in 
tradition conflicting social responses are natural. At times the 
reaction is oppressive and at others it is violent. Attitudes, 
practices, prejudices and taboos take time to change, but I do 
see a big social change in the offing. Academicians, the mediao o o
and the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are all 
contributing to this change, but the Superior Courts are taking 
the lead in interpreting the tenets of Islam qua issues relating to 
marriage in a more dynamic, liberal and progressive manner. 
This court profile is in consonance with our religious ethos, our 
constitutional commitment on gender equality and accords with 
the underlying theme of CEDAW. @
Mr Justice Tassaduq Hussain Jilani
Judge, Lahore Hiyh Court, Lahore, Pakistan
This article is based on an address given in 1999 to commemorate the 
20th anniversary of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CFDAW).
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